Every act is done by God, that is to say, all the One Divine essence does all and the Persons unite in willing every particular and inspiring it and ordering its accomplishment. But this does not make it impossible that the actual accomplishment be worked out by one Person specially. 'The Son doeth nothing of Himself, but what He seeth the Father do.' That is to say; the Father designs each act and wills it and shares in the spiritual emotion consequent on it—in a word, does it, while the actual execution is the Word's. There is no contradiction in terms here; the brain does an act, which a member executes for example.

Apply this principle to the Incarnation. We find that the Son in the fulness of His Godhead was incarnated: the Word became flesh. This Incarnation was willed and planned by the Father, and carried out by the inspiration of the Spirit. We can, therefore, say that God was incarnate, without saying that the Father was, or that the Spirit was, in the same sense as the Son.

My whole self is in the hand with which I write, yet my whole self is not bounded by my hand. So God Himself was in Jesus Christ—the fulness of the Godhead; yet the Godhead was not limited by the Man Jesus. The one is a mystery, and the other is a mystery.

If one denies that my whole self is in my hand, then I ask him, What part of myself is in my hand? Is my spirit divided? No; and, therefore, you can get no further than this, that the fulness of

the Godhead was in Christ, yet was not bounded by the Man Jesus.

Spirit is such a mysterious thing and its relation with matter yet more mysterious. How much more then is the nature of the presence of the Infinite Spirit—God—in relation to material things a mystery also?

We, therefore, confess that in this matter we have a mystery which does indeed utterly transcend reason, though it does not conflict with it. It is only a special case of the general mystery—that is, God's relation to this universe.

ii. The Incarnation and Becoming.

The Word became flesh. It is objected to this cardinal text that it represents the conversion of the Godhead into flesh, and brings God into the category of becoming, that is, contingency.

We need not reply to the first objection, for the text does not say 'the Word was converted into flesh'. From this point of view, the Church has rejected the theory of conversion: 'not by the conversion of the Godhead into flesh, but by taking the manhood into God.' Nevertheless, the text does undoubtedly say became. Let us look at the matter closely.

We assert that this matter entirely goes back to the previous initial difficulty of creation and relation. We assert that no new difficulty is added, but that this becoming is simply an aspect of the original difficulty.